0:01So, so there are the the shift that is occurring that started, you know, when commercial data became >> [clears throat] >> um you know, the community became aware of its of its risk and of its power. And we do a lot we did a lot of stuff not, you know, cowering in the corner.
0:20We used it. Yeah. Um Yeah, we get that.
0:25Um moving to that sort of commercial mindset. Not everything has to be a black box built by Q.
0:35Um we need to sort of in this data environment where uh maybe you've heard people talk about something called ubiquitous technical surveillance, UTS.
0:45Um Actually, I have heard UTS, but but fill me in on this.
0:49>> Yeah, so you it's everything that we've talked about, but the community refers to it as ubiquitous technical surveillance. So, it's the cameras, the Wi-Fi sniffers, adtech, everything that's sort of ambient, you know, um the the the Stasi-trained Roomba on Adderall. Mhm. Um particularly in environments where surveillance is just part of the deal.
1:16Uh UTS has has made it such where it's like I'm going to go down the street and I'm I am I can never consider myself black.
1:29So, instead of, you know, I can run an 8-hour surveillance detection route and [clears throat] there's no physical surveillance. I don't have, you know, guys following me, but they're following me through my phone.
1:44>> Right. Or or through proof of presence based upon the cameras, Wi-Fi sniffers, everything that sort of makes that talks to each other.
1:52>> talks to each other. Yep. Um and so, part of that risk is okay, so maybe I got away with something today, but when that gets outed, the adversary's going to roll back that tape to see every other person you met with, every place you went, um and that's, you know, that's that's problematic because you may not even see what what you did that revealed or outed your asset.
2:21>> Oh, it only takes one split second, like one step in the wrong place and the whole thing's gone. Yeah, absolutely.
2:28How much do you know about cuz like you you 10 years ago got pulled into this world and then suddenly we're like the guy to talk to one and we'll get >> when you when you're sitting at a table uh with a bunch of like PhDs and SIGINTers and and they're like Mike Egly is the subject matter expert on global and you're like >> [laughter] >> what? You're like the Jewish comedian?
2:51Me?
2:53I'm I it's, you know, um the that's those are those are moments when >> You're like, okay.
3:02Am I the am I really that good?
3:04>> gosh. Right. But point being, you did become the guy, right?
3:07>> And so that that's going back 10 years and then you get thrust into this world and again, we'll [snorts] go through some of the different things that happened there.
3:13>> Yep. But like now, you know, through your job and through the people you get access to and the jobs you're on, you're also, I'm sure, naturally learning about all the other [ __ ] you didn't know about that, you know, how data's collected, technology, all those things and you've become an expert on that over the years. So, how much is it applicable to say like if someone's using their phone in a restaurant, right? Some random lady right there, not associated with anyone, she's just some lady. And like you're an important person, you're sitting at that table talking to someone. Is there a spy
3:45agency that's in her phone and listening to what you're saying? Like does that kind of thing exist? I don't want to say ubiquitously, but far more commonly than we might think.
3:56Probab- I mean, probably not the random person that's in proximity, but um so this is, you know, everybody is is sort of focused on the principal or the the target or the the the the leader, right?
4:11Um as a means of extracting or targeting information. But these people, and they are locked down. Like you're not going to hack, you know, Trump's phone.
4:23They're not.
4:25If he even No, they're not. It it's just I I'm going to go on good faith assumption that somebody has made it such that his phone is a no-fail mission, like, you know, it's not going to get hacked.
4:37>> Okay.
4:38Anything's possible, but um >> I've heard about some interesting phone calls he makes, that's just why. Yeah.
4:44I'm wondering.
4:45>> But it's the people that around him that are probably not as opsec uh sensitive.
4:52Um tracking Putin. So, you know, there were headlines that we were tracking Putin.
4:58You were tracking Putin.
4:59Wasn't tracking Putin, I was tracking his bodyguards. Were you doing this from your bedroom again?
5:04>> Mhm.
5:05Yeah. Oh, that's awesome.
5:06>> Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Uh [ __ ] you, Slava.
5:09Gotcha. And when that came out, we even got Putin's spokesperson to have to address it.
5:16So, anyway, that was >> So, he said in Russian like death to Mike Egly.
5:21>> They didn't name me. If if I'd gotten I think I think there was one interviewer who was like, I don't know who this, you know, he he totally destroyed my name, but Little [ __ ] make Egly [ __ ] Pay this man. Pay this man his man his money.
5:37>> [laughter] >> Um that was a great [snorts] movie.
5:41>> Oh, the best. Kid's got that alligator blood. Can't get rid of him.
5:45>> [laughter] >> What what was the where he's like Nyet.
5:49Check. Check. Step. And he just goes right to >> Oh, yeah, where he's like, "CHECK.
5:53CHECK. ALL NIGHT THIS MOTHERFUCKER."
5:56YEAH. PAY this man his money. That's Um I love that you know that. That's great.
6:01So, Yeah, the Oreos in the ear.
6:03>> Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah.
6:04>> [laughter] >> Um So, I think it's it's anything is possible.
6:11I also think that um you know, the media environment is such that every day of the week there's some new uh thing that we need to be worried about. Um the most recent one is uh you know, Wi-Fi signals as a as a way of detecting identity based upon body fat.
6:29Yeah. What what?
6:30>> Yeah, so the density so, you know, uh Bluetooth and Wi-Fi um are measured based upon these uh RIZZI signals, you know, uh transmit, bounce back. Like what is the time?
6:43And some lab, some university came up with a way of of being able to detect um your body composition as a means of This is just an example. Like you would have to have sort of collected so much data to be able to start determining body types and and, you know, figuring out who's who from from those signals.
7:06But every day, you know, I and I get my phone lights up with, "Hey, did you see this?"
7:12Like what do we what do you want me what are we going to do about it?
7:15You know, some company, some research lab has proven that you can detect identity based upon body fat uh body density of an individual based upon the RIZZI signals. So, wait, that actually does I'm I'm just adding something in my head. Tell me if I'm like cooking the wrong thing here, but I've been wondering recently, I've talked about it on some podcasts, about things that I know verifiably I never [snorts] typed into Google and I never said out loud.
7:44Some things I thought in my head, some things I couldn't remember if I thought in my head, but ads would show up that spoke directly to that thing. And now that I'm thinking about it, most of the ones I'm thinking about are stuff that have to do with like little injuries or knickknacks or like stuff to do with my health or obviously like it can detect I'm moving and I'm in pretty good shape and stuff. I wonder if that is a part of the data tracking. Could could be. I would say I I get this question a lot where um you know, in fact, uh the Secretary of State who is um >> [clears throat] >> and I like him and I think he's I think
8:21Rubio Rubio. Yep.
8:23Um [snorts] he was talking to a group. Um I was there and he was lamenting the fact that uh he's taking he's learning Italian.
8:33Uh he's doing it online using, you know, Babbel or one of these online language Antonio Margariti.
8:41>> Yeah. She's going to start doing it.
8:42>> And he was talking about how now I'm getting all these ads, you know, in Italian or travel to Italy and, you know, how how does that how did that happen? And I would like to think that our Secretary of State who is negotiating our data sovereignty uh you know, bilateral agreements would know better. And and maybe he was just being glib, but um It's not a great question.
9:02>> The point being, there's probably there is no um there's probably something that you did or there is something within your data streams that has predictable value that landed that ad on your phone based upon some very benign signal, um but in the but in the algorithm world, that signal is, you know, red alert.
9:32Like he is he is managing an injury, he is he is primed for us to advertise whatever. Yeah. There's there's always something trying to do a forensic um breakdown of that is is hard because it is it can be such a weak signal. Like I could you know, Or they could be using like cuz that's crazy.
9:56>> Yeah, I mean, think um you know, if you use any of these um home um you know, smart home things where you're talking to Alexa. Yeah, I don't either.
10:07Um you know, you're it's not you're talking to Amazon's infrastructure. You don't own that [ __ ] Like you're going to talk to Alexa.
10:19Alexa's going to print your voice. It's learning from your language. It's predicting your times of when you're telling it to play music or turn the lights off or whatever you're asking it to do.
10:29Um you're feeding a large language model that Amazon will use against you to advertise to you when you are on the Amazon app. And Amazon is like a $4 billion advertising business.
10:42That's it?
10:43I mean, it's been around for 2 years, 3 years. That's it 4 billion.
10:49It's only been around for 2, 3 years?
10:51Their advertising business. Really? So, Amazon been around for a >> yeah. They're and you know, they they stand up you know, like we're we're good at this. Let's turn it into a business.
11:02So, their demand side, their their advertising business alone contributes $4 billion.
11:08>> Yeah, first of all, I didn't know that was only 2 years old. Secondly, $4 billion even seems like that's going to be $40 billion in 2 seconds or should already be. I mean, it's like cuz they own I mean, look, I ain't going to lie.
11:18Amazon's incredible. So, think about it this way. Amazon can you know, used to go you used to be you'd go like on Google search Yeah, [ __ ] Now, you're just you're searching so Amazon sees you at the point of interest.
11:32How you sort of navigate and do product selection to the point of sale. Yep.
11:37>> They have that full visibility.
11:39Um and this is this kind of upended Facebook's ad business because Facebook's uh or Meta's promise was, you know, um somebody looking at a you know, cute cat videos is is predictive of some other than, you know, other than they like cats and but >> Right. cat videos don't sell advertising, don't sell product.
12:05Understanding like this is a person who is buying whatever uh dog food. Um >> [clears throat] >> Lunchables. You've got kids, you know, whatever you are buying is indicate is an indicator of your lifestyle.
12:19Amazon has the full visibility of that.
12:22They understand that this is urgent.
12:25Oh, yeah.
12:27>> I have no doubt Amazon knows everything about my purchases.
12:30>> you know, that's you know, that's called um sort of the first-party data market where in the early days, you had you didn't have a segmentation of third-party data data brokers.
12:43Um and first-party data, you know, Uber, Amazon.
12:47Um you just had this amalgamation of of data and everybody was trying to figure out how do we monetize this? How do we sell product through these data sets?
12:57Um and because [clears throat] of privacy, because of um people getting smarter um and because of AI, companies that otherwise were like selling data because they had no other means of valuing it, they're like this [ __ ] is gold. Oh, yeah.
13:15>> All the metaphors, data's the new oil.
13:17They've figured out why and how to use it for the for the benefit of their business. Yeah, I feel like data it I've heard the oil line a lot, but data as far as the way it's been monetized and used technically with people's approval now, but like must be honest, not really.
13:38It then when you think about how it's packaged and put back in front of you to tempt you with everything including things that maybe you shouldn't be doing or shouldn't be a part of. In a lot of ways, they're creating like the new [ __ ] smoking in a way. You know, they're they're creating the constant scrolling because you're constantly getting things customized to you. It's not just the social feeds customizing content. That is that because that is literally using these data companies to do that. So, back in the day when everything was retail, I mean, the science behind a physical retail store
14:12um just-in-time or or impulse purchasing. Like those end caps and that [ __ ] that's at the register.
14:19That wasn't you know, like it was just an afterthought. It's let's put candy where you know, the kid's going to start begging for the candy bar and the mom's you know, trying to check out like fine, here you go. There's a reason why that shit's there. There's science behind it.
14:34Just like there's science in in how an online store is configured to to capture share of wallet.
14:42What colors sell? Things that you know what I mean? Like you go to the food store. Like I don't [snorts] ever go to the food store anymore. Amazon actually delivers it right to my door. But I I eat very clean. So, when I went down to shore this summer, I had to stop at the food store a couple times and I realized consciously afterwards I never went to the middle aisles for stuff. I think I went for one bag of brown rice. Right?
15:04But everything I was getting I'm like wow, I am really doing the natural thing cuz everything in the middle is all the [ __ ] processed stuff that has the red, blue, all the nice colors that makes you go ooh, I want to buy this.
15:12Yep. There's a reason for that and that goes back to, you know, Sam Walton um setting up Walmart and how to how to maximize that experience for the customer and maximize spend from the customer.
15:26>> Right. Um So, I I think it's it's um I think as as citizens, as people, we just need to be aware of these things as a means of not uh not taking personal agency for granted or thinking that >> [snorts] >> um I'm just going to let somebody else do my thinking.
15:52Well, that's the thing and you pointed this out correctly yourself a little bit ago.
15:56There's always a line somewhere even for the most conscious people. That line of convenience just cuz of the way the world is set and I'd actually liken this psychology similarly to like a parent these days if they have a 16-year-old and they still don't let them on social media.
16:12I get that as a like a that seems like a smart move, but then it sets them behind in in their social circles forever and you're like [ __ ] over the kid. Yeah.
16:21Even though you have the right intention, you know, and it's a similar psychology when you're like I know I don't want to give my data anywhere, but that means I also literally can't do anything that I have to do to have a functional place in society every day.
16:32You know, how do you find even if you find that balance, aren't you still kind of accidentally accomplishing the same ends that we're talking about? If in some places you can't buy a $2 cup of coffee without having the stupid app on the phone. Right.
16:48You can't get on public transit without having an app or paying without you know, cashless society. So, what do you do? Well, you've got to just you can't I don't think you can have a monolithic attitude. I think you have to understand what all of this means and um and just and and know that you are in control uh not the not the tech companies that really benefit from um compliance Yes. and um conformity. Yeah. Now, let let's actually go back to that because you were saying very early on when you were going through some of the I don't know, the pipeline here or whatever. It obviously all comes back to
17:35as we know like the Apples and the Googles of the world. So, everything you've been breaking down since then is a lot of the middleman thing in this industry that's forming these people who pull the data and sell it. But like focusing on let's say Google for a minute.
17:51What is their responsibility these days for the infrastructure that we've created as far as like how ubiquitous everyone's data is? Are they are they completely in the wrong still or are they trying to make some improvements to that the government's not making them do to improve people's ability to have some privacy?
18:15I don't think in their charter uh they have uh obligated themselves to humanity's cause of of self-autonomy and governance. I don't believe that's in their charter.
18:29>> I don't think it is either. Um What is their their charter is like something really weird again? Yeah. I forget what it it was like Oh my god, what was Google's Do no harm.
18:38Do no harm. That's it. Yeah.
18:40>> Yeah, yeah. Um which you know, the the the kids at at at Google used that as their justification to do that walkout in that that protest over Project Maven which Google was helping the Department of Defense um basically categorize a bunch of images um you know, to do uh for image wreck, right?
19:03>> Image wreck?
19:03>> Image recognition. Oh, recognition.
19:06>> Yeah. So, you've got a drone that's that's doing um full motion video flying over, you know, whatever.
19:13And you're tagging, you know, that's a car.
19:16That's a that's a truck with a technical. Um And the Department of Defense was having them do this. Yeah.
19:22Yeah, yeah.
19:22>> I mean, the Department of Defense probably created them so Yeah. So, I mean, this was this is like but this is how by the time the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center or whatever the hell they call themselves now could have figured this out. It's this is they need the they need to be able to pull in a Google to do these kinds of things cuz they'll they'll forget more than, you know, the Department of War will ever know. Yeah.
19:46Um So, um in terms of uh you know, it we are it is a it is a business relationship between consumer and Google consumer and Amazon you don't have force to use Google right but you know you you're going to make choices but they're also and this is this is the thing about the system I say this is someone who really likes capitalism and thinks it's the best system of all it still has its flaws right and so Google unfortunately through their quarterly forced reporting is incentivized to have to constantly grow it's in the charter of any company that you have to you know serve your shareholders and stakeholders
20:34>> which goes back to they are their business is correct >> capturing intent behavior and being able to do some to productize that >> absolutely >> that is like it's a there's a you know it's we call these things super apps so you've got your Google Mail Google Maps calendar a bunch of different right they're all effectively the same you know it's an integrated um application infrastructure um and you know that is that is Google's responsibility to their shareholders and this is where I feel like we make it too black and white sometimes when we righteously complain about some of the things these companies
21:16do which I do all the time but you know the in the intonation can become like oh they're evil and everyone who works there is evil evil I just googled it there's a hundred eighty seven thousand employees at Google I guarantee you most of them aren't evil right now are there probably a few who are I'm sure that's just the law of numbers but it's like the intention may be not even bad or good just like all right let's get to the next quarterly how are we improving our business meaning it's at least not a bad intention but the road to hell being paved there on the way is what has led to so many of these
21:49problems that were [ __ ] forty shoots down the slippery slope on yeah how do we pull ourselves up from that nose down position how um you know this is I I talk to privacy maximalist all the time and I'm like are you going to stand behind the press release that Google releases that says we are now going to charge fifteen dollars a month to use Google apps because of all of these data privacy regs and you know what we can't do to provide a free app are you going to be the ones to say that's a good thing because I can tell you that consumers when when Google says it's going to now cost you fifteen dollars a month
22:34to use all of this stuff cuz we are we have to make money but if we can't advertise and we can't do all of these things >> [snorts] >> who's who's who's going to take accountability for that and talk about you know talk about rioting in the streets when you have to pay you know ten bucks to log in to Instagram as a means of protecting your data you're going to have you're going to have riots I agree because it it adds up you get a family of four we can all do math and you think about economically where so many people in the country are you know living paycheck to paycheck these are things that they have been trained to have as a
23:10part of their life for free for decades >> yep yep you can't just unring that bell it's a utility and it's you know it's not free um you're the product >> you are the product and that's that's part of the deal and should you know do we wind back to the point where we don't have mobile devices and our you know all of those conveniences do we put that back in the bottle no that's not that's not realistic but I think from from the operational community from from the intelligence community there are um there are as many opportunities as there are vulnerabilities um can you explain what you mean I think
23:55I know what you mean >> so if we can if we can extract very detailed awareness information at lower risk lower cost lower risk to life um about places [snorts] we're interested in governments we're interested in communities we're interested in versus having to deploy case officers who are going to yes >> convince somebody to commit treason and and if we can if we can use it to our advantage um as opposed to constantly you know seeing the the lurking um shadows of it I think that this is the future of of collection um as you know and this goes beyond the sort of open source it's like now we want to have the relationships
24:44with the companies that provide you know >> [clears throat] >> skated devices um for you know facilities we want to be able to understand those those data sets we want to be able to tap into um the app store in Iran that would be nice yeah yeah um we want to be able to access commercially WeChat data that would also be good all of these things that's kind of the future of commercial intelligence of commercial data as a means of this goes beyond you know populating sort of the CIA factbook about demographics this is you know this is a a more specific >> sure um output um so these are the these are the
25:37opportunities the community has to sort of come to grips with there is no defeat button to ubiquitous technical surveillance it is what it is it's ambient it's you know it's you're not going to you're not going to figure out a a way of there's no tradecraft to defeat it mm um you know back in the Cold War you know they had these things this thing called Moscow rules which um was a was you know tradecraft overhaul to be able to operate in Moscow and and they did all sorts of cool stuff >> like what um do you ever see the movie Far Argo oh yeah yeah Ben Affleck yep so that character was sort of a concealment
26:24um expert mm um I think it was called the Jack in the Box where if you you you roll out of the embassy and you know that they're on your tail Russians Soviets are going to follow you right you got to wave to them you pull out of the embassy [clears throat] you're doing you know you make a right you've timed it and you know that when I make that right hand turn I'm going to have five seconds where they're not going to be able to see me so the guy in the passenger seat bails out car keeps going they push a button I think it was called Jack in the Box and up pops a silhouette >> yeah oh my god and to the to the to the
27:12Soviets tailing it looks like yep two people are in that car meanwhile you know they've created a a a gap to be able to to go do their thing that's genius >> so you know those were the types of things that you could get away with when it was physical and you had the um um you know you had you were operating against humans operating against pervasive AI and data it's just it's harder so we just have to get more clever in how we do things and where we do things and the cover needs to be perfectly normal and legit and we can do that by understanding like it's perfectly normal and legit for somebody who
27:55may be affiliated with the US Embassy to be in a coffee shop with somebody who is doing nuclear research how do we how do we create that overlap so that from a data perspective it looks perfectly normal how would you do that um so understanding um it's it's not a you have to you have to go deep into those patterns of life and look for those overlaps so I use this scenario or talk about the scenario a lot um there was a an asset who was really into those rock climbing walls mm uh and so aligning a case officer who's also into rock climbing who could build that pattern of life who could I got a better
28:41story I got a better story for you all right let's do the better one Mike >> [clears throat] >> I'm back going to roll back to my prove it okay scenario I'm a hockey player wait you are legit yeah yeah you look like a hockey player >> so um you know played through took it as far as one could go as far as I could take it um you went to the NHL no oh no I tap I I my you're supposed to say yes I would have given it to you it didn't um but it's when you see like guys you've played with um like I played Pee Wee hockey with Jeremy Roenick love dude I'm a Flyers fan I love 7 >> so and he was like we knew you just you just knew
29:29um anyway so there's this thing called lunch puck um where you know at lunchtime it's pick up hockey I'm doing my data analysis of the Russian Embassy and I see that I got four guys with that play hockey.
29:51And they go they play, you know, lunch puck. In Russia? Uh no, in DC at the rink where my men's league team plays. And these are Russians?
30:02>> These are Russians. They were attached to the embassy.
30:05You know, they're >> [clears throat] >> And so the the the hypothesis is, all right, if I know that they are going to be at this rink and I have every reason to be there.
30:17Like, I know how to put on my skates, I know how to hang out in the locker room.
30:22I know how to do all this stuff.
30:23>> You're like, put me in, coach, let's go.
30:25I'm like, can I can I put myself in a locker room with four Russian dudes at the appropriate time and be able to, you know, like, develop a relationship with them playing hockey. Because you've got that you've already you already have that uh uh commonality. Yes.
30:49And took me it took on the third day here you could smell them coming before they got you could smell the cigarette smoke on their clothes before they even got in the locker room. And I'm like >> [laughter] >> And so, you know, this would be something that they call a bump. Yes.
31:09Uh so, if I wanted to bump somebody and I knew what their patterns of life were and I wanted to have somebody who could who already had [clears throat] commonality with them to be able to strike up a conversation about hockey.
31:24And I'm, you know, I'm sitting in the locker room with them. I'm like, you guys Russians?
31:27Uh You just said it right there.
31:29>> Yeah, yeah.
31:30You want some [ __ ] perogies at?
31:32>> Yeah.
31:33Um I I was in the Soviet Union in 80 in the 80s playing hockey. So, you know, talk just bonding, right?
31:41This is the kind of [ __ ] we can do with this type of data. We can put the right person in the right space to be able to not approach somebody and say, hey you want to sell out your country, but have that Yes.
31:56>> more of a natural flow. And this was again you know, and I'm I took selfies with them. I'm like, here they are. Here's their you know, here's where they come from Wisconsin Avenue embassy. Here are the routes they take.
32:09Uh and I was able to affect this on my third try.
32:15Cuz I couldn't there wasn't any consistency like it's Monday, Wednesday, Friday. It was, you know, some days it was Monday, some days it was Tuesday. On the third day of placing myself in in a location where I knew they frequented, here they come. My friend Jim Diorio has been on the show a bunch.
32:33He was a West Point special ops guy and then ended up FBI and did like a lot of undercover work. He has a phrase where he said, politeness and familiarity breed access.
32:44And you're basically creating all the familiarity. And you got that done before they go through the door.
32:49>> Without having to develop it or pretend Mhm. You know, like, I know how to tape up my shin pads. I'm not like figuring it out.
33:00>> [laughter] >> Right?
33:01>> I'll bet that's happened.
33:02>> Or my equipment isn't all brand new, you know, and I get out there.
33:06It was like I had every reason And and it was just a test. Could I do this? Is this is this doable?
33:14And yeah, it's doable. You ask him for some nuclear codes?
33:18>> I was like, you know, it's kind of like in Slap Shot when the guy approaches the Hansons and says, are you guys brothers?
33:27>> [laughter] >> Uh you know, I'm like, are you guys Russians?
33:30You know.
33:32Listen, I love the Russians. Absolutely.
33:34Big fan. Yeah. Big fan around here.
33:35Yeah.
33:36Uh and they like they sucked. I was I'm like, you guys are Russians?
33:40>> weren't good?
33:41>> they weren't they >> they were great at hockey. It's cold and [ __ ] out there.
33:45>> That's wow. So, but you're still playing you you doing a lot of pick No, so COVID like took my league out of action and I just I I would have >> to get it back.
33:54>> have to drive, you know, and it's like late and I'm I'm at a point now where I'm not going out on a Sunday night at midnight. Oh, that's a lot. Yeah. I'm like, no, not doing that. That's the thing [clears throat] about I like the hockey lifestyle. The kids who come up playing that, mad respect, man. They learn crazy discipline cuz they're up at [ __ ] 4:00 a.m. going to rinks 5 days a week. I mean, that's why they're so tough, too, I think. I'm convinced of that.
34:19>> I mean, I talked about Jeremy Roenick.
34:21So, his dad was like the assistant coach, but he while he didn't know how to skate. So Oh, really?
34:26>> Yeah. But he was on the bench. And this is back in the day like all three coaches smoking cigarettes drunk from the night before. It was like old time.
34:37>> [laughter] >> You know, you know, you get you get your bell rung, it's like shake it off.
34:41>> Yeah, shake it off. You're a hockey player. What's a concussion?
34:43>> Yeah. Um But uh nice family and he was he was just a nice like nice kid even though people were already at that time like you know, showing him how important he was.
34:55>> Yeah, no, he was really really it that that's the thing in Philly.
34:59Like, we worship our sports teams and and the Philly fans are great at being able to sniff out scumbags and people that are full of [ __ ] and then they're great at being able to sniff out the guys who are like, yo, one of us.
35:12>> Yeah. Roenick was one of those guys cuz he had played a lot of his career with the Blackhawks and other teams before and when he got to Philly he was like he was a Philly guy. Yeah. People were like, we [ __ ] with this guy. Yep.
35:21[snorts] You know, the kind of dude that would go out to the bar with the fans after the game.
35:24>> Yep. Yep. Down-to-earth guy. Really liked him. Very down it it was it was an experience.
35:30>> Yeah. That's cool that you played with him growing up. Yep.
35:33>> You play with some other guys, too, at some point, I imagine. Yeah. Um probably guys you hadn't heard of, but um I went to boarding school in Massachusetts. So, we had couple guys drafted. Um [snorts] um You go to Exeter?
35:48I went to Governor Dummer Academy.
35:50>> Governor Dummer? Yeah. Now it's they they're the branding experts. They brought in, you know, the branding experts came in and said we probably But William Dummer was one of the >> [laughter] >> founding he bequeathed his farm back in the 1700s.
36:05>> Yeah, he bequeathed the name, too. Wow.
36:06>> name. But um um so, we put a couple kids into the NHL.
36:12Um um So That's cool. Yeah. All right.
36:17>> Yeah. So, one of one of the things I was wondering though cuz like I'm always thinking about where data can be sucked up. And now I'm talking to someone who's worked with this from like a intel and counterintel aspect of it by showing us to the government. And again, we're going to come to some of the specific stories on that soon. But if you're someone who works at any level of the government, you could just be someone who works at the State Department.
36:44You're not a spy undercover there.
36:46You're just a regular kind of administrator, whatever it is.
36:49You have access at some point to something that's worth something, for sure. It's just a part of the job. So, if on when your daughter's on spring break, you guys decide to take a trip to France, like a friendly country or something like that. They still, you know, we all gather intel on each other as far as the countries go. Like every country's doing it to each other.
37:11When when they land at the airport aren't there tools that every piece of data in their phone is just sucked up into the ether right there? Yeah. Um Are you are you referencing France specifically? No, but I I know the French are pretty [ __ ] good at [ __ ] >> Okay. So, if you've Have you have you flown into Charles de Gaulle? Have you >> I haven't. I lived in Italy, but I never went to France.
37:33>> Okay. All right. Um And and other airports and I can talk about the Emirates, which are really good, too. So, um at Charles de Gaulle when you are queuing up to go through border control, you are uh in this it's it doesn't make any sense, but you are like, you know, walking you're doing this loop to get to to to queue up for the for the line.
37:58And what they [snorts] are doing is you are passing through Wi-Fi sniffers, which are collecting your MAC address. And each time you do a pass by, it's it's basically a quality check. Like, yep, same device. Yep, seeing it again on this pass. Seeing it again on this pass.
38:14Um as a means of, okay, so when you queue up and you present your passport we have your passport and we also have device identifiers about you.
38:25Um when you are, you know, if you are a government employee, like firstly you know, um and they they do briefings before you travel as to what you should do and shouldn't do.
38:38Um but, you know, a lot of these countries take electronic they they have converged electronic signatures to append right to your passport. So a MAC address or an ad ID or some benign Yeah. character can be attached right to an identity with a picture.
39:03It is what it is.
39:05The Emirates, the Emiratis uh were contemplating looking at somebody's credit report.
39:14And if you present yourself and you are, you know, in your 40s and your credit report is like a page long that's a that's a red flag. Because if you're in your 40s, your credit report is going to be like 15 pages long. They weren't looking at the content of the report. They were looking at the density of it to detect or to determine uh to predict like this is what's normal.
39:38>> [laughter] >> And this is what's abnormal. They're wow. The Emirates.
39:42>> God, the way you got to create legends now if you're like trying to create a spy, it's like No, it's not doable. Oh my god.
39:49>> Yeah. So then that goes back to the point of you know, how do you operate in a denied area, hostile environment? You're not cover is just it's too flimsy. There's no way to backstop it with well, your cover only has a two-page credit report. Nobody in their 40s has a two-page credit report. You've had a couple mortgages, you've had a you know, you've got bunch of credit cards. Your credit report is going to be should be 15 pages. Do they use dead people though?
40:18Yeah.
40:19>> Meaning like do they did do like I don't know, CIA or something if they're trying to send someone into [ __ ] you know, Saudi Arabia? Yeah. Could they find [clears throat] if if it's a 42-year-old case officer, could they find a mid-40s >> [clears throat] >> you know, deceased person that had a credit report and try to tie that report to them even if they change the name?
40:38Assuming that the Saudis don't have access to to records and death certificates.
40:42>> name.
40:43>> [snorts] >> Um I think it's I think it's it's too risky. Mhm. Based upon I know that I know that Google wouldn't buy it. I know that your mobile network operator wouldn't buy your ability your your attempt to to to sort of fraudulently spoof uh behavior.
41:00Um I just I don't think it's the future of intelligence operations. Is Now, this might get in This is a really specific question and the chances that you actually would have been involved in this probably aren't high, but I don't know.
41:15I'm just thinking of like an enormous uh international incident that occurred where there was like a investigation afterwards. In in 2018, you I believe it was 2018. You had the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in the Turkish in the Saudi Embassy in Turkey.
41:35And there's, you know, some security camera footage of guys who went in obviously we see him go in and then we see some other Yep. dudes in suits go in who landed on a certain plane from a certain place obviously and then we see them coming out, but we never see the body. We just see bags or anything. But hypothetically, given the fact that those guys were all carrying electronic devices, this is after you started blowing the whistle on this stuff. I would imagine at that point the United States probably had the ability to track where those people were going and track exactly where that bag ended up.
42:07>> Possibly.
42:08Yep.
42:09I was not on that. Okay. That's what I would say, too, if I Yeah. Um um but it's it's possible.
42:19>> Mhm. Um you know, um uh Khashoggi was um his devices were all um exploited. Mhm.
42:32Um so he didn't he didn't stand a chance based upon how how deep they were into his communications. Right. Um [clears throat] which is um I have uh over over my travels, I have been in meetings with Arabs and Israelis.
42:58Oh.
42:59Uh [clears throat] They meet together?
43:02And it was I was ready for like we're it's a it's a it's a buyer's meeting. We are the Israelis are selling surveillance gear.
43:11>> Of course they are. And the uh [clears throat] country that I was working with was buying. From the Israelis. From the Israelis.
43:19>> Openly. And I got to tell you like the Israelis it was inshallah and it was the the the uh >> [snorts] >> the the the the the king's representative was an Air Force general and it was, you know, very the 802 guys were very like deferential. Yes, general. Yes, sir. You know, and they're in, you know, like there is no uh hiding, you know, we we knew who they were.
43:45Um and it I was expecting there to be some you know, uh conflict.
43:53Not at all. But there So like the Israelis obviously are excellent at creating various forms of technology. They create a lot like a lot of the VPNs are based there. Yep.
44:05Spyware is based there. We're going to talk about Pegasus in a second.
44:09Obviously that's a controversial one that that comes up a lot, but like why would a major especially, but any country, but a major Arab country trust people who have demonstrated an incredible ability to make technology that they house in their own country for intel purposes so they can keep their nation alive who a lot of people around them want dead. Like why would they trust that and buy that?
44:38They did cuz it's the best.
44:43That's so interesting.
44:44>> It was it was it was eye-opening and so everything that you, you know, read about like that these people they can't get along, you know, the Israelis were speaking Arabic. Um Oh, wait. Yeah.
44:55Yeah. Yeah. You know, um but the the uh the collection the intercept kit that they were purchasing um and this is, you know, 50, 60 million dollars worth of gear.
45:10Um the the the business relationship was as cordial as as you would have It was surprisingly cordial. Wow. Um [clears throat] the Arabs, you know, they knew we need to get a deal. We need this we need this gear.
45:28This is the best stuff that's on the market. So let's figure it out.
45:32>> Okay. Let's let's take that quick tangent though and talk about Pegasus. I and and I don't know how much you've dealt with it personally or in your endeavors or whatever. But you have this technology that literally it can just send a text to the phone. You don't even have to open it and boom, they're in and they can open. I remember Nick Casalucci, my friend who's a hacker, tell me about this in episode 72. He's like they're in. Yep. I'm like just just from send I don't have to do anything.
45:58They're in. He's like yeah, they're in.
45:59Yep. Like how crazy is that that something like that was created and can be operated with impunity around the world?
46:10Uh yeah. I I don't really have [clears throat] anything to say about that other than like that's the kind of [ __ ] that we should be doing.
46:21Okay, there's the second question.
46:23Do we do this and people don't know about it? Sure. Yeah. Yep. So it's it's back to it comes back to it's not just us either.
46:30It probably comes back to a little bit of mutually assured blackmail destruction. A little bit.
46:37>> I think it's um uh as tech as capability evolves, it's one of it's one of those seductive like, yeah, we can do this. So let's do it. Mhm. Um and I and and when it's an adversary, yeah, absolutely we should be doing it.
47:02Yeah. Um But that's the thing even you and I both know, you probably know a lot better than me cuz you've at least seen this world. Like everybody does it on each other. Even friends, you know? Like Britain spies on us and we spy on Britain. So when it gets when you cross the line is when um and and the work that I was doing, it it was a seat a cyber CT program.
47:27And my first RFI, my first tasking was a group of people in another country. Okay. Partner country.
47:37And I'm doing my research and it's like this this woman's a school teacher. This is a Catholic priest. This guy is a lawyer.
47:48Um what do they all have in common?
47:51They were very vocal in dissent of a corrupt government. Mhm.
47:58And we're prepared we're preparing we're doing all the engineering to to sort of attack uh this group. And they they they were thought leaders. Like they were the the center of gravity that could have Online?
48:16Online.
48:18In the public square. Like they were known in this in this [ __ ] ass OPEC, but small little African country.
48:28>> [laughter] >> Okay.
48:31Uh and I'm like, all right, so let's make sure that there's something that I'm not seeing here before I get all righteous. Um but that's what they were. They were political dissidents and you know, the type of person that we want to support.
48:47Um not somebody to attack and discredit. [clears throat] Oh, meaning they were used that I I don't I just use this term as like a term not to like attack, but like useful idiots for whatever, you know, They they were freedom like legitimately, you know, we this is a corrupt government, you know, our people live on a dollar a day and the So let's amplify them. The president is like, you know, just bought his next, you know, took a took a delivery of like three Maybachs. Yep.
49:19Um and uh so they're advocating for you know, equality and and attacking corruption.
49:32The president of that country reaches out to his partners in the Middle East and says, "Can you help me with this?"
49:40And they're like, "We got it."
49:42Now, how did they help him with that?
49:44Um I don't know if they went that far, but they're probably they're probably they were silenced.
49:56What what kind of methods might they use to prison?
49:59Trumped up charges, but you know.
50:02>> Um We know where you're going to be. We know who you're communicating with.
50:06>> Right. So, here's the Here's the network. Like got it. We're expanding the network. Got it. Okay. Um this was this was written about. Um and cuz they uh this country hired a bunch of, you know, IC US types to go stand this thing up and >> [clears throat] >> um it was just it was bad.
50:29But who is the most notorious user of data for intelligence purposes around the world? I'm talking countries.
50:38>> China.
50:40By a lot? Yeah.
50:42Why?
50:43Um because uh their policies >> [cough] >> You know, if if put it to you this way, if if the um if if there was a explicit policy without warrants or probable cause, but yet Google, Amazon, Apple you had their cloud their their storage systems and the and went into their their storage systems and then that same data would go into a government storage system or the government US government had access without, you know, probable cause or or >> Which they would never do.
51:20>> Which they would never do.
51:21>> Right.
51:21>> In uh in the PRC those those data sets um are it is it is just part of the >> They own it.
51:33>> They own it.
51:34>> Yeah. Yep. Um And they don't let a lot of our companies operate in there either. Yeah. So, this is um this is one of those things when we're negotiating with, you know, when we're doing a bilateral discussion with with China, we don't have access um either legally or or otherwise, um our companies aren't monetizing WeChat users.
52:01The Chinese the great firewall prevents that because they have always known the importance of data as a national asset.
52:13This insidious TikTok discussion.
52:16Insidious. I mean, it's just because it's gone on for so many years, um it's not shouldn't be lost on anybody that the ban came into finally came into a got a floor vote when the algorithm was indicating consensus or trending negatively towards a certain country that wasn't going to have it.
52:42That's when the vote became serious.
52:45Been talking about it for 5 years, going back to the first Trump administration.
52:49You wouldn't be talking about Israel, would you?
52:51>> Oh, yeah. I was.
52:52>> [laughter] >> Um And so, but but you know, we don't have uh reci- reciprocity with China in terms of understanding the patterns, profiles, behaviors of TikTok users in Beijing.
53:10>> That's right. Uh and that to me is just uh that's unacceptable. Yes, I agree.
53:15>> Who's [ __ ] who is advocating and negotiating these deals and >> [clears throat] >> having these these discussions um with with with a nation like the PRC?
53:26>> it though, Mike, too. Like this is the point that I think it's lost. Like we make all these jokes righteously so about, you know, name your favorite congressman here who's suddenly worth $120 million from stock trades cuz they get inside information. But then think about all the ones who aren't doing it like as deliberately and openly like that who, you know, they're on a $150,000 [snorts] a year salary, but, you know, to them then being worth 3 4 million dollars, that's a lot of money, right? So, you take a little bit of money through some weird lobbying in the background and suddenly you're going to vote for things
54:00that maybe affect China downstream through three other types of votes in a good way and us in a bad way.
54:06Uh it it This is the this is the story that's, you know, like, "Okay, um Congressman Sanders, help me understand how you have amassed this constant >> whoa whoa. Relax. Relax, Mike. Hold on.
54:20>> Yeah.
54:21This constellation of real estate and net worth really good financial advice. Democratic socialism, emphasis on democratic. Yeah.
54:32Um Larry David should should play Bernie Sanders when they sound like I can't tell the difference between >> seen him on SNL do it? Oh, has he done it? Okay.
54:40>> Oh, oh my god, he's incredible at it.
54:42Right. So, it's already been done.
54:44Um I think that um when when these things happen right in front of us and we try to assign all of this complexity and and explanation to understand what common sense would say, "The fix is in.
54:59Why is this happening the way it is?"
55:01Um you know, uh You you know, you have a congressman who couldn't point to Israel on the map and next thing you know, they're the biggest God sent them.
55:12>> my biggest friend Israel.
55:14>> Like what was what was in that Manila envelope >> Yeah. that was slid across the desk and, you know, friends took look after friends. Here's here's the thing, Mike, and this is the [clears throat] part of the conversation that pisses me off that we don't have cuz it's legitimate to have all this conversation and wonder what the [ __ ] is going on.
55:30But like, you know, there's so many things we can point to that Israel's done in the past that are just wrong. There's a long list of that and it's like what the [ __ ] are we doing here? And then you look at like the AIPAC thing and stuff like that. And yeah, point to them.
55:44But they're using the system that we set up and allowed them to use and allow them to use. All of our people in DC let them do this. So, let me just stick myself in their shoes. If I were a country that had 10 million people and I had a friend over there that had 350 million with the greatest military in the world, I'd invest in a system that allows me to do it as well. And let me even bring this back to China and I want to read what we pulled up there, Joe.
56:08That was good. We'll get that in a minute. But to pull this back to China, you mentioned the TikTok thing as well, which we're going to talk about that and the ties to Israel in a second. But with China, it's like I hate communism. I think it's terrible. This is one place though I always point out. I'm like, "Fuck, they got a little advantage right here."
56:26Because the government is communist and therefore the people don't have any freedom, they can do something once in a while that's actually positive. For example, turn off TikTok on all their kids' feeds at 9:00 and before 9:00 when they're watching the feed, instead of like titty videos and and [ __ ] like that like our kids are watching here, they're watching nature videos and science videos and [ __ ] >> physics entropy and physics and yeah, yeah.
56:51>> So, they and they already count really well over there and do math better than us. So, they're ahead of the curve.
56:55That's actually scientific why that is.
56:57But like you look back at our country and it's like they get to use the freedom of our democracy against itself to fight their own battles and it [ __ ] blows my mind.
57:06>> Yeah. Yeah. The I think that they um they built an app. They didn't invent, you know, like uh Instagram had been around for a long time. They just they looked at and their algorithm feed is informed by interaction. How do you do you watch the full length of the video? Are you fast forwarding? Are you rewinding?
57:31That's their the signal that they use to to amplify and tailor other stuff to you. It's really um pretty pretty smart. Uh but engagement with with that stuff is is is how they do it. Um And and then they train you on it. Uh they they rewire your brain.
57:51>> Yes. Uh which is, you know, which is a thing. Yep. Um to you know, you have to elevate those dopamine levels each and every time. And that um you know, it's hard to point to and say, "Look at the algorithm." Like Okay, show me algorithmically where this is happening. We know it's happening, but >> [snorts] >> um This is the this is the the the consequences that we will certainly feel in 20 years.
58:18>> 100%. Well, I mean, we're already seeing it on >> it. But like in 20 years, you're absolutely right. Like what are the how much worse do the downstream effects get?
58:26>> Generationally, you know, when we're able to sort of look at uh progress or development. I mean, we could start on um the the torture that >> [snorts] >> kids today are going through because of this stuff. The isolation and >> Um Exactly. It's, you know, are we going to are we going to just going to kind of look at it and say, "Yeah, it's too bad." or do we look at it and say, you know, there needs to be there needs to be a something needs to happen.
58:55>> Yes. Um you know, [clears throat] Discord did not kill Charlie Kirk.
59:01Um you know, >> [clears throat] >> um Uh the the the the dumbest people on the planet talking about Nazism and fascism and that Trump is both did not kill Charlie Kirk.
59:17Tyler Robinson, an isolated kid going through some serious psychological issues Mhm. killed Charlie Kirk. And what caused that?
59:30Isolation. Mhm. Uh I think I think we have gotten to a point where there's a there's a generation that if they don't get their way, they can't figure out how to move forward.
59:44Um to the point where they believe that they are the the one standing in between, you know, righteousness and evil. They want to be a hero.
59:55Um you know, how much how much are we going to accept when you've got a 22-year-old kid in a romantic relationship with a cisgendered male who's transitioning to female and not wonder, not call that out as there's some there's some trauma there. There's something going on.
60:18>> 100%.
60:19Cuz that's not I mean, cuz at the end of the day he's trying to find himself in a heterosexual relationship. But he's going about it really, really >> through the back door.
60:30>> [laughter] >> Sorry.
60:32>> That's That's That's going to be a short right there. Thank you guys for checking out this clip. If you haven't already subscribed, please subscribe and hit the like button on this video. It is a huge, huge help. And if you'd like to check out this clip's full podcast episode, that link is in the description below or right here. And finally, you can follow me on Instagram and X by using the links in my description below.
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