Getting to the numbers on the battlefield to the equipment to the drones to the way that this war goes on. What can you tell us about the situation?
0:12Well, I think the situation for Israel relative to Iran is going to continue to get worse.
0:20And uh There are bunches of reasons for this. I can talk I can talk a little bit about the technology issues. And I I'd like to do that. It's it's really not You know, it's it's it's irrelevant in the sense of providing a foundation of understanding to the audience. It's not It's not immediately relevant to the situation of the the moment, but but it it it sheds light on it, so it's important to contemplate it. So, if we go to the slides, for example, why don't we take slide two? And for the moment, you know, There's been an And this is a very interesting thing.
1:04This has been an extraordinary mismanagement by Israel of its air defenses.
1:10Let's go to the next slide. I'll show you that.
1:15Here's a your This slide is uh Your PDF You may want to click on the PDFs screen and see if you get It's not showing clearly.
1:29Whatever you got. Okay.
1:31Um this is a time-lapse photo of Iron Dome interceptors being shot into the air.
1:39You can see tens of interceptors. Now, what you see is the rock the the the camera This is a photographic camera and the the shutter is open for maybe 10 or 15 seconds.
1:57So, as as the rocket motor drives the interceptor along its trajectory, the rocket motor produces a point of light. If you were to do an instant photograph, you'd just see a point of light. But the point of light is moving, so it traces out a line. So, the lines you see are the are the trails of the interceptors as they are rising up because you had a bright point of light, which is as it moves, uh produces a line.
2:33Uh which tells you the which shows you the motion of the interceptor.
2:39Now, you see these interceptors all are climbing up and then they're they're turning downward. They should never turn downward.
2:48The only way to have a chance of intercepting a ballistic missile target is to be is to be flying up the expected trajectory.
2:58So, all of these at the end of almost all of these lines, you see little points of light.
3:06Those points of light are the warheads on the Iron Dome interceptors, relatively small warheads detonating.
3:15Because but there's no target there for them to detonate on. So, it's it's it's the it's the interceptors flying up and and just exploding in the air probably because these intercept the system wants to destroy destroy the interceptor, so you don't get a full interceptor falling to the ground cuz it the ground damage is lower. Still significant, but Now, this should never have happened because those interceptors have no capability against ballistic missiles.
3:49But they are very capable against drones and cruise missiles.
3:54So, this shows that the air defense operations were throwing away interceptors against targets that they had no possibility of hitting. Zero chance of hitting.
4:10And instead, you could have saved these interceptors for the drone attacks that are now occurring.
4:17So, this is the kind of mismanagement of the air defenses that um I find astonishing. And the reason I say I find it astonishing is because a lot of the people I've known over the decades in Israel are incredibly capable people who worked on air defenses. I know how smart they are.
4:40So, I can't understand I like I had a discussion with one friend of mine and he couldn't explain it to me cuz he said I I'm I'm not part of the operations these days, but he says, "I agree with you. I have no idea I have no understanding."
4:54So, they've thrown away these interceptors.
4:56And and and that's a real problem that um the Israelis are facing now.
5:06The next slide shows the other problem that they should have anticipated, but didn't.
5:13And this shows you one of the It shows you several frames from a video of one of these Alpha Tau ballistic missiles coming into uh the atmosphere arriving at a fantastic speed. The speed of this of this warhead is probably probably Mach 10 or 11 or even higher.
5:44Now, the reason the speed is so high, if you look carefully, let's look at the upper left inset.
5:54You see something to the right of the main gun. That's a reflection off the lens of the camera. That's not real.
6:01That's just a an artifact of the camera reflect camera reflection from the bright part of the of the contrail to the left. But you see the front end of the of the contrail is very much brighter than the the remaining part of the contrail.
6:21That's because it's a rocket motor thrusting this warhead forward against the drag of aerodynamic aerodynamic drag because the warhead would normally slow up and you'd expect it to slow up to maybe 1 and 1/2 or 2 km per second if you do the aerodynamic drag calculation.
6:42But the rocket motor keeps the speed high.
6:46And so, when it hits the ground, it hits the ground at Mach 10 or higher.
6:52Now, if you look at the last slide to the right lower, you see the bright flash from the detonation and you see the sky is blue.
7:06The reason the sky is blue is because the energy at the detonation point is so high that the temperature is higher than you would normally see from an explosion.
7:19If you look at most of the explosions on the ground when when you don't have this highly energetic warhead coming in, the color tends to be red.
7:29Red or yellow, which indicates a lower temperature at the peak of the explosive energy output.
7:36This is higher because you have the kinetic energy of the impact, which contributes as much energy as the equivalent weight of high explosive. So, if this would not if there were no explosive in this warhead at all, it would have the kinetic it would have the explosive energy of its weight in TNT, but it's also has TNT in it.
8:01High explosive.
8:02So, you have twice the explosive density of of what you would have from just TNT or just the kinetic impact. And this causes a much more violent explosion, which causes much more damage at the at the aim point at the target point.
8:20And when you look at some of the damage areas, unfortunately, I I didn't have time to put it into this, you can see the effects of these much more energetic explosives. They are doing tremendous damage to very highly reinforced buildings.
8:37But these two effects, which have been going on now for for a large part of the war during the 40 days of this war, have resulted in the depletion of interceptors. So, if we look at the next slide, this is distilled from a Royal United Services Institute report that was published at the end of March. So, basically a week and a half ago, this is their guess. I want to It's a guess that they made based on their best estimates of interceptors being used up at a the rate at which interceptors are currently being used up.
9:24You can see that if you look at the last column, they're talking about the all of the Iron Dome interceptors being used up by the end of um of April or maybe May.
9:44That's not correct, I'm sure.
9:47I'm sure that we are nearly at the end of the Iron Dome interceptors being available.
9:54And we're nearly at the end of the air-to-air missiles that could be fired from aircraft against drones. So, these are the missiles that could be used against drones.
10:05The capabilities of intercepting ballistic missiles are near zero, no matter what you have left.
10:12In other words, the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 and David's Sling and THAADs have a very low intercept rate against the ballistic missiles. They've always had an intercept rate that's low.
10:23So, what you have indicating indicated on you know, we don't know for sure, but roughly speaking is you have a depletion of the air defenses against drones and an ongoing inability to shoot down ballistic missiles, but the ballistic missiles are more uh are even more difficult to hit and even more damaging when they reach the ground. And they reach the ground at a higher rate of uh at a higher efficiency and a uh the the percentage of launched missiles reaching the ground is much higher, not only because the intercept rates are low, but also because the missiles are more reliable.
11:08The the technical features of them make them more reliable during reentry, so the warheads essentially always detonate, which which earlier was not always the case because the Iranians were firing older missiles where the warheads sometimes tumbled broke up and uh sometimes did not detonate.
11:31So, so the situation we're now facing is summarized in the next slide.
11:38And we we're now being the uh the Israelis and the Americans.
11:44First of all, they've mismanaged their Iron Dome defense system.
11:48And that is serious because the Iron Dome has a very high effectiveness shooting down drones.
11:56But uh they uh they've expended most of them and they will be out of Iron Domes against drones. And the drones are uh very very problematic, as I'll explain.
12:10Uh the availability of timely and high-resolution satellite reconnaissance data is now uh is now available from China and Russia for Iran.
12:24So, the Iranians have information on the location of uh air defense units which you try to move around air defense radars and thereby this allows them to target those radars with their drones.
12:44And um uh we saw a a tremendous uh a tremendously effective attack on the ballistic missile defense radars in the first 2 days of the war.
12:58That was it that was effectuated by the strategic reconnaissance of the uh Chinese and the Russians that was given to to the um Iranians. The Iranians very cleverly, and I want to underscore here Iran's military planning has been superbly well executed.
13:25There have been no mistakes that I can find in in unlike the Israelis who I don't expect to make mistakes of the kind they made with their air defenses.
13:37I think what happened with the air defenses is they've been lying about the capability of Iron Dome against ballistic missiles.
13:44And they became the victims of their own propaganda and just wasted all these interceptors against targets they had no chance of hitting.
13:55And now they don't have interceptors to shoot targets that they do have a good chance of of hitting.
14:01So, that was a strategic blunder of a not non-minor uh level.
14:08So, um the Iranians have made no such blunders.
14:13So, they had these uh extremely accurate drones and they were able to use them to destroy these fantastically expensive and small numbers of ballistic missile defense radars that the Americans and Israelis had. In particular, there were four THAAD radars.
14:33I have a picture one of them later on in the in the discussion if we get to it.
14:38And a giant uh radar in Qatar that was critical for the overall defense of Israel against ballistic missiles.
14:49And this giant radar wa- was critical because the giant radar could see pretty much everything that was launched from Iran when it was launched and then tell the smaller, less capable THAAD radars where to look for the incoming ballistic missiles.
15:10So, these radars could then manage the the defense of interceptors the THAAD and Arrow 1 and Arrow 2 and David's Sling interceptors cuz the radars operated by those systems were less capable in terms of range and ability to acquire large numbers of incoming warheads.
15:30So, Iran took that capability away from Israel and the United States literally in the first day of the war.
15:41First day or maybe two.
15:43That was an amazing accomplishment.
15:46I did not expect it.
15:49I did not I mean I knew the drones were going to be a problem for the Americans and the Israelis, but I did not expect that the precision in finding targets of of of of great effect. In other words, the satellites gave the um the Iranians the key data about exact locations of these radars.
16:20Well, almost all of which could have been moved except for the big radar in Qatar.
16:25And it allowed the Iranians to put drones on these radars.
16:31And they did it very quickly.
16:33What I don't know but I'm pretty sure is the case is how many smaller air defense radars have also been destroyed.
16:44Because the um the Iranians have got information about those radars, too, but it's not as assured because the radars are smaller, they're harder to locate.
16:57But they certainly can uh be located with some uh efficiency by the Chinese and the uh Russian reconnaissance satellites.
17:10And those radars are certainly also being destroyed.
17:14And you know that has to be the case because the air defenses at the American bases in the Persian Gulf have hardly been operating.
17:25You see videos of these drones coming in and no interceptors being fired at them.
17:30And some of it may be just simply because the Americans have run out of interceptors.
17:38Which of course is incredibly an incredible oversight on the part of the Americans.
17:45And the other part could easily be because the radars to guide these interceptors no longer exist. They've been destroyed or damaged.
17:55So, the increasing losses of of of all these air defense radars is going to continue as the war goes on.
18:08And as the war goes on, the Iranian drones will have an easier and easier time to damage to go after critical targets that the Americans and the Israelis have.
18:25So, they the drones don't have as large a warhead as you you get with these ballistic missiles. So, you might have a 1-ton warhead uh where the whereas on the ballistic missile, whereas you have a 1/10 of a ton warhead on the drone.
18:44But you don't need uh 10 100 uh kilogram warheads if you have precision.
18:52If you want to bring down a building a a 100 kilogram warhead is more than enough if you can place it with meters of of accuracy.
19:03So, the fact that the drones have a smaller warhead does not mean that tremendous damage cannot be inflicted. Plus, of course, the numbers of drones you can bring to bear against targets of interest is enormous.
19:20Thousands, tens of thousands of these drones.
19:24And we know that the Iranians can continue producing these drones and uh and and they will be unstoppable.
19:34So, if we look at slide seven I can begin to tell you how even if they can preserve the radars it's going to be nearly impossible to stop the drones.
19:46So, that's another factor. So, I'm not only saying that the drones are going to be more capable of doing damage because they have high accuracy and and Iran has data from China and Russia that allows them to find the targets.
20:04So, they can find the targets and they can hit them.
20:07But, even when there are some radars that are preserved, they the radars will not be able to find the drones because the drones are increasingly able to fly very low and when they fly very low, they are in what's called the clutter, ground clutter.
20:26So, for example, when you talk about AWACS, airborne warning and control systems, aircraft born radars, those are going to be only of very limited capability against drones. So, uh they've already destroyed at least one AWACS on the ground and there will be others probably destroyed as time goes on. But, there will be some airborne warning and control system radars operating. Of course, they cannot operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. They They're now I think they may be five or six of these. So, you can have them on a 12-hour mission, so you need maybe three aircraft to keep two on station 24 hours a day cuz it
21:13takes time to to refuel and repair the aircraft. So, they do have airborne warning and control systems. But, if we look at the next slide, we can see why those airborne warning and control systems are of very limited uh capability.
21:32First of all, the Earth is round.
21:35Um and so, there are two phenomena that are extremely important. If we look to the left, we see a radar, you know, an icon of a radar dish.
21:47And the radar is looking straight out and there's a shadow. Uh the Earth is curved, so there's a shadow region below which the radar cannot see.
22:03And that shadow region is many tens of kilometers if the airplane in fact, it can be potentially 100 kilometers out because the if the airplane is in the air, uh like a like a radar warning a radar control system. But, notice there's a an area called the clutter zone.
22:27And that clutter zone actually extends out uh for quite a distance and makes it basically not possible to see the drones and I'm going to explain very briefly what clutter is because clutter is very important.
22:46Uh this this the clutter hides the drone in uh and makes it even when the radar has a line of sight to it, not possible to see.
22:57So, if we go to slide nine, the next slide, if we have an airplane that's flying at a high altitude, basically uh we can potentially see uh the um uh targets and we have a line of sight to the target uh even 50 or or 100 um uh kilometers away. But, that's misleading because if we go to the next slide, we see what the clutter problem that we see the is So, did I do that? No.
23:37Okay, the next Yeah. The next slide shows the um the actual um radar reflectivity of a drone. If we look at the left corner, we can see the upper left corner shows you the radar cross section of an insect.
23:56That's about 1/1000 of a square meter.
24:00The next one shows you the radar the next one below to the left.
24:05Go back to So, I get Yeah, there you go.
24:08If we look to the left and the one in the middle left, uh there's an icon of a drone to the right, we see the radar cross section of a drone is 1/100 of a square meter.
24:22That's really very small. If you want to get a sense of how small it is, if we look below the drone radar cross section, the radar cross section of a bird is comparable.
24:37So, how do you tell the difference between a bird and a drone?
24:42You you know, this is a problem. Now, it turns out there is technology for for doing this, but the technology is limited in in its precision.
24:53And so, the bottom line is you cannot tell the difference You you cannot see the drone in the clutter and I'm going to explain what clutter is just so your audience has a rough sense of this. And and the reason this is important is this is basically saying that even with the with the radar aircraft, the radar aircraft are not going to contribute to an air defense warning system against these drones.
25:22Of course, you're also going to run out of interceptors as well. So, even if you have some interceptors, uh the radar born system is not going to be able to guide those interceptors because you still need a radar for the air defense and those radars are being or being launched. So, uh so, uh or or or being destroyed.
25:43So, if we go to the next slide, we see an illustration of what clutter is.
25:50So, you're in an airplane and you're looking down at the So, we're looking down at the surface of the Earth.
25:59And uh you see you illuminate a patch of the surface area of the Earth.
26:07Now, imagine that surface area is acts like a perfect mirror.
26:15So, it's a perfect mirror. In that case, you would see no backscattered reflected signal.
26:23So, if there were a radar reflection from a drone, you would see the you would get that signal. It would be a very small signal cuz the radar cross section is very small, but you would not get a competing signal from the illuminated ground.
26:43But, instead, think of a flashlight. Think Imagine you have a flashlight and you're in an open area and you shine the flashlight down on a mirror the at this angle, you would see no reflection from the mirror.
27:01So, if you saw an insect flying above the mirror, you might actually see you'd see the insect above this black surface because you you don't see your reflection.
27:12But, imagine that the surface is made up of trees or if or or of uh mountains or of uh uh rolling hills or of grass or you know, then you're seeing a big reflected signal because you're illuminating a very large area relative to the area you're illuminating when you when you're looking at at the uh uh at the drone.
27:43So, the drone is going to get hidden in the clutter.
27:47And clutter comes from all kinds of sources.
27:50So, so, the big problem is not simply seeing the small radar cross section target, which is a gigantic problem by itself, but it's also seeing it against the interfering reflected signals from other sources.
28:06So, if we go to the next slide, we see that there are all kinds of con- contributions uh to clutter. You have weather clutter, you have rain, you have ground ground reflections, you have the if you look at to the in this particular drawing on the to the right and and below, uh you see an aircraft in a shadowing region because the shadowing region can be not only caused by the curvature of the Earth, it can be caused by objects between uh the radar and mountains or trees or whatever and the target you're trying to see.
28:51All of that is eliminating your ability to see targets.
28:56So, if I go to the next two slides, uh if you see that this slide is just depicting uh birds and and and trees and uh things uh giving me false signals, interfering signals.
29:13If I go to the next slide, I can see see here's a radar target area. So, if you look near the radar, there's all kinds of clutter from buildings or trees or whatever, uh further out, you can have uh um if you look in the upper right corner, you can have rain clouds, you can have echoes from uh buildings, uh you know, because you might have a set of buildings in some areas that sets up an echo.
29:47You can see one is called an urban spike.
29:51So, when the attack uh when the when the um uh when when the Ir- Iranians attacked the Abqaiq uh or oil field in Saudi Arabia, the drones came in.
30:08In this case, they were not drones, they were cruise missiles.
30:11They came in over buildings.
30:15So, you have these buildings.
30:17So, I have this drone.
30:19And here's the drone, and it reflects a very small amount of radio signal.
30:24And and the building is reflecting a tremendous radio signal.
30:28So, I'm trying to see this drone, it's a small signal from the drone against the uh uh the um uh the radar reflection from the uh signal. So, let me give you Let me just give you one very simple simplified idea of how the radar tries to see the drone. And so, there there are these very exotic radio technologies that are used.
30:56So, if we go to slide 16, we see a depiction of of how the radar tries to see I mean, the signal is is tremendously large.
31:13So, the radio the radar in blue sends I show it sends a signal out trying to see a low-flying drone.
31:23Well, the only thing that makes the drone uh reflection different from the reflection from the ground is that the drone is moving toward uh toward the radar.
31:38So, the reflected signal shown in green is of a slightly higher frequency than the signal uh from the ground. So, the ground is a tremendous signal.
31:52So, so this the processed signal shown in red here is a signal where I mix I intentionally mix the signal I'm receiving with the low-flying signal from the target. And what I get is a beat frequency that's depicted here.
32:16So, if I go to um uh to the next slide, uh I know the frequency of the signal.
32:24So, for a drone, I know the signal is going to be about 300 hertz.
32:30That's going to be the shift in frequency.
32:33But, the frequency of the radar is a gigahertz, a billion hertz.
32:41So, I have to have a frequency stability.
32:45If the frequency of the radar is is moving by a few hundred hertz, then I won't be able to see the 300 hertz frequency uh beat frequency. I'll be seeing a beat frequency, but it'll be just from the beat frequencies from my oscillating frequency. So, you can see how precise the radar signals the primary signal has to be controlled.
33:12So, what I've shown in the next slide are the beat frequencies for 1 and 2 hertz changes in frequency. So, if I have a 1 hertz change in the frequency, I get this beat frequency of uh of 1 hertz. It would be a 100 hertz in this case.
33:33And if it's a 2 hertz, you can see I get twice the beat frequency.
33:39And in the next slide, I show that the beat frequencies are the same even if I use In this case, I've assumed twice the frequency, but the beat frequencies are the same. So, no matter what the frequency of the radar, I get the same beat frequency.
33:56The problem is if I use a higher frequency radar like an X-band radar, which is a typical radar that I want to use for tracking high-precision tracking, then the frequency of the radar is 10 times higher, which means I have to control the base frequency to even 10 times more.
34:15So, the net result is I really when I look at the problem of controlling the frequency of the radar and also controlling the frequency changes because it's an airborne radar.
34:31So, there's a change in the frequency of the ground clutter from the airborne mo- mo- movement, I have methods for controlling that as well.
34:39It turns out I just cannot see these low-flying, very low radar cross-section targets.
34:47So, now I have the problem of drones that can home.
34:52So, if we look at um slide 21, we look at slide 21. This is actually an American uh drone, which which uses the Iranian design because the Iranian design is perfect. So, Iran can take credit for designing the perfect drone that everybody uses.
35:16This is a Shahed. I I I have it incorrectly marked as a uh it's a gen- the gen two uh version is is a Russian drone, which looks has an airframe exactly like the original Iranian design.
35:31The Shahed dro- drone is the original Iranian drone.
35:37And this is a an American design which uses the same Iranian uh uh airframe.
35:45So, Iran is the inventor of the kamikaze drone that's running havoc uh with the United States and and Israel now and leading to Iran being the dominant military power now in this current war.
36:05So, Iran's dominant uh military influence is now due to several factors.
36:13First of all, Iran has control of the Strait of Hormuz.
36:20So, Iran has a stranglehold on the economy of the world and also the American and and and and economies of all the other states in the world, including the American economy.
36:36So, so Iran has been able to preferentially provide oil to countries that it has identified as non-hostile, not necessarily supporting it, but just non-hostile.
36:53So, Iran is very cleverly thought through the idea, well, "We're not going to just stop it for everybody.
37:01If you're not hostile to us, we're going to leave it open."
37:04And by the way, uh Iranian oil the United Even the United States realizes that the Iranian oil is critical for keeping the total world economy from collapsing.
37:19So, now Iran is selling oil not at the reduced rate of $45 per barrel because Iranian oil was sanctioned by the United States, but it's now able to sell its oil at $120 a barrel. So, Iran is raking in money.
37:38I mean, it it it's almost it's it's almost a comedy that the Americans are now have now removed the sanctions on Iranian oil.
37:49So, all of a sudden, the Iranians are getting full price for their oil because of their control of the Strait of Hormuz.
37:58And of course, they're able to provide oil to non-hostile states. That's very That's a tremendously favorable situation for Iran in this war.
38:10The next situation they have are these ballistic missiles, which are doing tremendously more damage per impact than they could have been doing than they were doing earlier.
38:23And the next problem is Iran has the precision information on the targets.
38:30So, um now, some of this precision information could have come from other sources. Let me Let's go back to um the slide 22.
38:44This is from the original attack in September of 2019 that Iran made against the Abqaiq Saudi Arabia oil fields.
38:59In the bottom of this drawing, uh I've shown a satellite photograph of one of these oil uh processing tanks.
39:11And notice that what is shown in the satellite photograph are the holes in the oil processing tank that were produced by Iranian cruise missiles hitting those tanks.
39:30The precision of those holes is 2 m.
39:35It's incredible how accurately the Iranian uh cruise missiles were able to hit these uh these uh processing tanks.
39:48Well, I don't know exactly what specific technology the Iranian used, but I can give you a speculation.
39:57If you look at the next slide, what what the Iranians could have done is taken a satellite photograph of of those tanks. In other words, they didn't have to have help from China or Russia. All they needed was a commercial photograph of those tanks.
40:18And in the upper left corner here, what they what they did is a cross co- So, the the the the the cruise missiles have an image of what they're looking for. Here's the image. It's my hand.
40:35And uh Now, what I have is the image and what I do is I cross the image with with with the image of my hand. I do it electronically.
40:48So, when I somehow come across where I cross all the all the light gets passed through. None of the light gets passed through when I'm not lined up properly.
40:58So, you see these three peaks.
41:01This is a simulation I actually did.
41:03This is my simulation.
41:06It's a It's a guess.
41:08And what I've done, if you look to the right, I've show you the uh the peaks of of of of the cross correlation. And then in the bottom uh in the bottom image, I show you the peaks of the cross correlation overlaid on on the targets.
41:31So, this would have could have been done with satellite imagery and cross correlation, which we know the Iranians are well up to the job.
41:43So, here's an example where it's not a drone being homed necessarily being homed by uh what's called first-person guidance.
41:56In other words, it's not necessarily a drone operator who is sitting far away receiving a television signal from the drone guiding the drone into the target. This could simply be a drone that is a robot.
42:12And it knows enough to know where to go before it opens its eyes and takes a photograph of what's in front of it and cross correlates that photograph with the target.
42:28So, here So, you can see you begin to see how problematic these drones can begin to become because now I have the ability to do real-time uh homing.
42:41In other words, I I'll talk about that Well, I can maybe talk about it in the next because we're we're now coming to the end of it. But But the simplest conceptually simplest idea is that I have a drone that I I'm looking through a television camera, which means that the drone has to be sending a television image back to me. I might be thousands of kilometers away, and then I have to give the drone signals. I don't need to do that in this particular case.
43:10So, so now So, Iran the indications are, at least to me, that Iran has drones that can do cross correlation with images of the targets as well as drones that can home directly on on signals from television cameras inside the drones.
43:33So, that's the uh uh So, those are That's a big innovation. Um Maybe I should stop here and uh since since uh and I can talk about how they can do it some other time uh uh how Iran is doing this, but the um the availability of the um uh Starlink system is now making it possible for Iran to use drones to do real-time homing on targets. So, what happens?
44:12They get an image of the real-time situation. Actually, let's go to 30 slide 33 just for a quick second.
44:24Go to slide 30 33 33. Yeah.
44:33So, if you look at slide 33, here's before and after.
44:38So, I have an image of where these radar domes are.
44:44So, I can do I can destroy them in two ways.
44:48I can have an image of the radar dome and cross correlate it with the drone as it comes in as I described earlier.
44:55Or I can simply home on the radar drone using a video camera.
45:02And the video camera can get its information from uh uh a Starlink uh signal. Let me just show you Let's go to slide 38 and I'll stop after this.
45:20Uh this particular this this You see this square on the right.
45:27This is a Starlink uh radio uh uh radio terminal.
45:34Let's just go one more slide forward.
45:38One more slide. And here you see this little dog, cute little dog, next to the Starlink uh communication system.
45:47That Starlink system can be It weighs only a pound or two. Let's go one more slide.
45:56There it is in a box that you can order.
45:59Notice the box has instructions for how to use it.
46:03You can go out uh Nima can go out and he can order from Amazon for about $250 one of these things and you'll get it in the mail in a few days.
46:15And you can then modify that and put it on your drone.
46:19If you know how to utilize the signal, now you then you can send your drone out looking for a target and you can be using the drone communications through your Starlink satellite communication. Now, let's say I'm in the United States. I say I don't want Nima out there using that drone.
46:37Well, how am I supposed to know Nima is out there using the drone? I've just sold him a terminal.
46:43The terminal has encrypted communications because that's the way you keep the signals secure for people who wanted to communicate just normally.
46:55So, how do I know that it's Nima with his drone flying around looking for something to hit?
47:02I've no way of know So, I have no way of selectively turning off the drone signal to to to Nima. All I can do is turn off all the Starlink satellites that are functioning over, let's say, the airbase.
47:17But if I do that, then I turn off all the Starlink communications that the airbase is using.
47:23So, I have a dilemma.
47:26So, the problem is is very serious. The Starlink communication system.
47:31So, now we see how the the modern technologies uh navigation technology, GPS, uh Chinese Baidu system that are widely available. These are very high-technology systems.
47:48But they're universally available. You don't need to understand the system. You don't need to be able to build it yourself. You just need access to its service.
47:59And so, you have the service, you have the high-precision real-time satellite imagery from from the Russian and Chinese satellites, and you're in business.
48:15And you have Russia who has been attacked using American The Americans have attacked Russia via Ukraine by giving Ukraine missiles to attack Russia.
48:29And Russia has told the United States They told the United States when the United States did this.
48:36If you do this, we, at some future time, will be giving information to someone else to attack you.
48:46All right. You did this in Kursk and you did this uh You you you did this in Russia.
48:54And you you gave the Ukrainians all this information. You gave them satellite surveillance information. You gave them communication information so the drones could attack our strategic bombers, for example.
49:08Okay. You want to You want to play that game? That's fine.
49:12Because we're going to attack your AWACS. We're going to see that the Iranians know where those AWACS are parked.
49:20We're going to see that the Iranians know where the radars are.
49:23Uh and we're going to give them that information, and they're going to have the navigation resources that they can just buy commercially, and uh good luck.
49:33You know, and now Iran is benefiting from these services.
49:39And so incidentally are China and Russia because they're in the mode of they want those countries want they want Iran to prevail.
49:52And Iran I think will prevail in this. I think the war is going to get worse and worse and worse for the Americans. And my gravest concern is that as Israel gets into a more and more desperate situation they might be foolish enough to use nuclear weapons.
50:13And the American political decision-makers better make sure that Israel understands that they are on their own if they ever use nuclear weapons against anyone.
50:28You know, they are absolutely on their own forever.
50:34Completely.
50:36Cuz I'm concerned that this crazy guy Netanyahu who who has the mentality I want to definitely has the mentality that Adolf Hitler had doesn't do something to bring down Israel along with everybody else.
50:56And Adolf Hitler would have brought down Germany. We know we we have every reason to believe he would have brought down Germany if he had the ability to do it with nuclear weapons because he was suicidal.
51:10And it would have only taken an intervention of the kind that Albert Speer did. Albert Speer was his architect. He told Albert Speer who was running the German economy to destroy Germany.
51:25And Speer failed to follow his order because he didn't want Germany complete.
51:31Otherwise Germany would have been destroyed if that order was carried out.
51:37So you have to hope that either Netanyahu is not as crazy as he looks or that people who follow his who he who he would order to do the job will refuse to do the job. And and I sincerely hope that the kind of Israelis that I know are in the loop and they would refuse to do the job because they're smart enough to know that it would be the end of Israel along with a lot of other things.
52:09But I don't know how much uh control uh has been taken by by this man, this lunatic.
52:20So anyway, so I'll leave it.
Read the essay version →